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Much new light has been thrown upon the history of the seventeenth
century, and large masses of new documents have become available
since Hallam wrote his classical ConstitutionalHistory over a century ago.1
POLITICAL SPECULATION
The seventeenth century was an age when conscious and deliberate
political theory entered the arena of practical politics. At the same
time there were undoubtedly important economic factors which played
a large part in the conflict. Religion also added endless complications
to an already baffiing situatiotJ.. Elizabeth held the reins of Church
and State, but the Church itself had been based upon a denial of tradition
and authority; the Church consequently had no answer to fresh denials,
save to shelter behind the throne. To an extraordinary extent public
thought was turning to various forms of sectarianism, and speculation
very frequently took the form of theological controversy. The theory
of the State was less developed. The age of the Tudors and of the
1 See the references below, p. 52 n. 1. The 4th, 5th and 6th volumes of Holdsworth's
History supersede previous histories 'of the Tudor and Stuart periods on the legal aspects of
the struggle. More general studies are by K. Pickthorn, Tudor Government (2 vols., 1934);
J. E. Neale, Elizabeth (1934), TheElizabethan Home ojCommons (1949), and Elizabeth I and h".
Parliament.r (1953); G. R. Elton, Tudor Revolution in Government (1953).
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Reformation had for the moment carried practice far ahead of political
theory, and the pressing business of administration had overshadowed
the more sober business oflaw. The great names in the age of Elizabeth
are not those of lawyers or of judges, but of councillors and secretaries.
Against the administrative State there was bound to be a reaction,
especially when the nation began to doubt the wisdom of the policies
pursued. The spirit of theological questioning was to be extended to
the State, and so the uncertainty of the foundations of religion, and the
breakdown of the old theories ofecclesiastical authority in the established
church, resulted inevitably in the bewilderment of those who sought for
the foundations of the State as well. In the end, attempts were made
to use the few remnants of mediaeval thinking. The Crown naturally
turned to the doctrine of the divine right of Kings, but interpreted
it in a narrow sense which a mediaeval philosopher would hardly have
recognised. In this way the old doctrine of the divine origin of civil
government became restricted to a particular form of government,
that is to say, a monarchy, and to a particular section of that form, the
King himself. In opposition to all this, the revival of the common law
brought back a view which more nearly represented the mediaeval
attitude. This view was drawn to a large extent from the pages of our
greatest mediaeval lawyer, Bracton, whose celebrated work on the laws
of England was first printed in 1569 and again in 1640. In this book
Sir Edward Coke and other common lawyers found the simple mediaeval
doctrine of the supremacy of law. In an alleged altercation between
James I and the great Chief Justice the issue was clearly expressed:
James, by his prerogative, claimed to be above the law by divine right,
and to this Coke replied by quoting the memorable words of Bracton:
"The King is subject not to men, but to God and the law!'l In other
words, Coke was prepared to revive the age-old dogma that law, divine
in its origin and sanction, is the basis upon which civil society is built,
and that this law is supreme above King and people equally. The
theory of the divine right of Kings, on the other hand, ascribed this
religious character to one branch only of the machinery of government,
the King. Soon it became evident that there was danger of the latter
doctrine combining with the newer notions of the State (resembling
somewhat the theories of irresponsibility which a later age was to pro-
duce), to create thereby a sort of" Leviathan "-to use the later term of
Hobbes. Regarded in this light, the conflict of theory between Crown
1 Coke's version of the incident in Prohibitions del Rqy, 12 Rep. 63 (and in Tanner, Con-
stitutionalDocuments ofjames I, 186-187) has been examined by R. G. Usher in English Historical
Review, xviii. 664-675, who suggests 1608 as the date, and shows that a violent scene did
occur during which Coke expressed some such doctrine as that in the text above, " after which,
his Majestie ... looking and speaking fiercely with bended fist offering to strike him, which
the lord Coke perceiving, fell fiatt on all fower". It is not so certain that Coke actually
quoted Bracton (though he may have done). All the evidence indicates that Coke argued
long and sufficiently effectively to put James into a frenzy in consequence of which the King
lost his dignity and Coke his nerve.
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and Parliament is one between the mediaeval view of a paramount divine
law, supreme over every aspect of government, and an attempt to transfer
this divine sanction to a monarch who is also to embody the State in the
more modern aspect of the word. From this point of view, Parliament
represents the conservative side and the Crown the side of innovation.
From another angle, however, the positions might appear to be reversed.
When it came to the details of the actual powers which the Crown had
exercised in the past independently of parliamentary control, it was a
plausible argument for the Crown to insist that it was, in fact, basing its
position upon mediaeval precedent. This was particularly true on
various matters of indirect taxation which the middle ages had left in
great obscurity. In asserting control over these matters, the House
of Commons laid itself open to historical arguments of considerable
force, which would have been stronger still if the Crown had been able
to secure the services of antiquaries as learned and zealous as those of the
parliamentary party. Even so, when it came to the judicial interpretation
of mediaeval precedents, the courts more than once had to find for the
Crown-and we are at perfect liberty to assert that the judges who made
these decisions reached them honestly and properly upon the historical
evidence available to them, although they often spoilt the effect by
gratuitously introducing a good deal of dogma on divine right. The
historians of a later age, imbued with partisan spirit, have certainly
exaggerated their wholesale accusations of subserviency against the
Stuart judges. From this point of view, therefore, it is the Crown
which seems conservative and Parliament the innovator. However, the
Commons were fortunate in possessing several antiquaries of truly
prodigious learning; William Prynne, for example, had read enormous
quantities of mediaeval rolls. Sources which are voluminous even in
modern reprints and abstracts, Prynne could quote at great length
from the original manuscripts, which he had studied by candlelight in
the dank vaults of the Tower. Only those who have had to spend
many hours with mediaeval records can appreciate the immensity of
his labours. As we have already mentioned, the ambiguous rolls of
the fifteenth-century Parliaments were a particularly rich mine for
the opposition, being easily susceptible of interpretations in their
favour.
THE SUPREMACY OF THE COMMON LAW
From what has just been said it will be clear that the frank acceptance
of the principle that current problems were to be settled upon the basis
of antiquarian research might work both ways, and in fact the very
honesty with which it was followed has had the effect of making some
judges give inconsistent decisions. At times, Sir Edward Coke seems
to be a champion of prerogative, although at other times he is one of
the most intrepid of parliamentarians. He must not be blamed too
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much for these inconsistencies! which were really implicit in the whole
of the parliamentarian argument. He himself seems aware of this weak-
ness, and to remedy it he fell back with great ingenuity upon a position
which he skilfully developed, and which has had immense influence,
especially in America:
" Urged by a presentiment of the coming conflict of Crown and Parliament, he
felt the necessity of curbing the rising arrogance of both, and looked back upon
his country's legal history to find the means. This instinctive appeal to history
for guidance was characteristic, and the choice of a legal rather than any other
solution was amply justified by the remarkable continuity and stability of English
law during the vicissitudes of the seventeenth century. His attitude is aptly
expressed in one of his own picturesque phrases. ' Let us now peruse our ancient
authors,' he wrote, 'for out of the old fields must come the new corne.' So it
was in this spirit that he laboured at the ancient patrimony of his profession, those
short, thick folios of black-letter Year Books, and from their forbidding mass of
obsolescent technicalities raised a harvest of political theory which was destined to
be the food of far-distant states to which he had never given a thought.
" The solution which Coke found was in the idea of a fundamental law which
limited Crown and Parliament indifferently. What that law was, its nature and
its contents, were questions as difficult as they were insistent-and, as subsequent
events showed, capable of surprising solutions. The nearest we find to an explicit
definition of this fundamental law is the assertion of the paramount law of' reason '.
For the rest, the common lawyer's' reason' is left in as much uncertainty as he
himself ascribed to the Chancellor's equity. Moreover, Coke was prepared to
advance mediaeval precedent for his theory, and in so doing has drawn upon his
head the criticisms of later investigators. Just as these criticisms are, from the point
of view of modern scholarship, it is only fair to the Chief Justice to insist that his
view of history was not ours, and that it is only by the standard of his own day
that a true evaluation of his learning and intellecrual honesty can be formed.
Although it must be confessed that even then he cannot be found altogether fault-
less, yet it is believed that a sufficient explanation will be found to establish his
bona fides. His doctrine is certainly based largely upon mediaeval precedents and
the extent to which they justify it is an interesting subject for investigation. But
if we reach a different estimate from his of the Year Book authority for his dogma,
this must not be taken as necessarily involving a severe censure of Coke. He
himself has told us that though the fields are old, the corn is new."2
This doctrine was first proclaimed by Sir Edward Coke in his judg-
ment in Dr. Bonham's Case (1610),3 and for nearly a century afterwards
the idea that the common law could be regarded as a fundamental law
seemed attractive to certain minds. The Crown viewed the new theory
with alarm, and Coke was ordered by the government to explain his
doctrine and to " correct" his reports.
1 For further remarks on this topic, see below, pp. 242-245.
2 Plucknett, Bonham's Case and flldicial ReviezlJ, Harvard Law Review, xl. 30; cf. Mackay,
Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supremacy of the Law, Michigan Law Review, xxii. 215-247.
L. B. Boudin, Lord Coke and the American doctrine ofJlldicial power, New York University Law
Review, vi. 233-246, suggests that Coke later dropped the idea, and S. E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham's
Case, Law Quarterly Review, !iv. 543 that he had never held it. The latest survey is ]. w.
Gough, Fllndamental Law in English Constitlltional History (1955).
88 Rep. 114.
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THE GROWTH OF THE CONFLICT
A solution so simple as this frank return to the mediaeval idea of
law could hardly have a chance amid the riot of party passion which
was soon aroused. In this place we shall be content with only a very
brief summary of the stirring events which occupy the reigns of James I
and Charles J.1 To begin with, we have a long series of precedents
on the subject of parliamentary privilege such as Shirlry's Case (16041,2
and Darnel's or the Five Knights' Case (1627).3 The powers of Parlia-
ment were further asserted in impeaching unpopular ministers. Worse
still, the procedure by bill of attainder was revived. Then again a long
constitutional conflict arose over matters of taxation. The obscurities
of this subject during the middle ages had never been thoroughly cleared
up, and there was a good deal of justifiable doubt as to the powers of
the Crown in this respect. Bate's Case or the Case of I1l1positions (1606)4
decided that the Crown without the concurrence of Parliament could
increase the rate of customs duties. A variety of other expedients were
devised for raising money, such as the revival of the forest dues and the
demand for ship-money. This latter was contested in Hampden's Case
(1637),5 which also was decided in favour of the Crown. It is note-
worthy that previous to the trial the King called upon the judges to give
him an extrajudicial opinion upon the questions at issue. Their answers
were in favour of the Crown and were ordered to be read publicly in the
Star Chamber and enrolled in all the courts of Westminster. In the
midst of this conflict Sir Edward Coke was compelled to take a side, and
finally became one of the leaders of the parliamentary party. The crisis
came in 1616 when the Case ofCommendams 6 raised some technical points
of ecclesiastical law and the validity ofa royal grant in commendam. Coke's
dissenting opinion in this case immediately brought about his dismissal
from office. Events steadily moved to a climax. The House of Com-
mons defended its privileges fiercely and claimed complete freedom
from royal interference for its debates and its members. At the same
1 Further details are to be found in the classical work of Hallam, Constitutional History of
England (1827), of which there are many editions, including one in the handy" Everyman's
Library"; the standard work is S. R. Gardiner, History ofEngland (10 vols., 1883) covering
the years 1603-1642. A very careful discussion of the legal aspects of the period will be found
in Holdsworth, vi. 1-302. Valuable and easily accessible collections of documents are Prothero
Select Statutes and other Constitutional Docu111mts, 1558-1625 (4th edn., Oxford, 1913); Gardiner:
Constitutional DOCl/111ents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (3rd edn., Oxford, 1906); and
Tanner, Constitutional Docu111ent! if the Reign ofJa111es I (Cambridge, 1930).
2 Fully discussed by Prothero in English Historical Review, viii. 735; documents in
Tanner, 302-317, and Prothero, 320-325; Common!' Journals, i. 149.
33 S.T. 1; extracts in Gardiner, 57.
4 2 S.T. 371; extracts in Tanner, 337-345 and Prothero 340-355' commentary by Derek
Hall in Law Quarterly Review, lxix. 200. ' , ,
• 3 S.T. 825; extracts and other documents in Gardiner, 105-124.
6 Reported as C:0~ and Glo~er v. B,ishop if Coventry, Hobart, 140. A c011/llJeI1dam is a papal
(later, royal) permission allOWing a bishop to hold a benefice at the same time as his bishopric'
see Gibson, Codex Juri! Er.c/esia!tici (1761), 912, 1528. '
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time the House was assuming control over every source of revenue and
was deliberately using the power of the purse in an attempt to compel
the Crown to dismiss ministers, and to pursue policies at the dictates
of the Commons. It is this claim which makes the history of the seven-
teenth century so totally different from that of preceding ages, save,
perhaps, the superficial resemblances in some respects which are to be
found in the fifteenth century, while the Lancastrian monarchy was
extraordinarily weak. Finally, the Commons embodied their demands
in the Petition of Right1 (1628) which contained a long list of grievances.
Rehearsing a number of statutes and several provisions of the Great
Charter, the Commons declared that arbitrary imprisonment is unlawful
and that a Privy Council warrant setting forth the King's special com-
mand shall be no sufficient return to a writ of habeas corpus. The un-
reasonable billeting of soldiers and the trial of civilians by martial law
were likewise denounced.
THE CHURCH IN POLITICS
From 1629 to 1640, Charles I contrived to rule without calling a
Parliament. Grievances were steadily accumulating. The Church of
England (unwisely led by Archbishop Laud) was suffering more and
more from the spread of dissent, and it was inevitable that the Church
and the Crown should make common cause against those who com-
bined a dislike for the establishment with anti-royalist principles. The
laws already existing against nonconformists were enforced with great
harshness by those courts which were most amenable to royal influence-
the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission. Consequently,
the conflict was still more embittered by the introduction of a religious
feud. Finally the Church question was to be the ruin of Charles. He
rashly undertook to impose Anglicanism in Scotland upon a, people
whose religious fanaticism even exceeded his own. A war was the
immediate result and then came inevitably the summoning first of the
short Parliament (1640), and then of the long Parliament (1640-1660).
By this time, Parliament was master of the situation. The Earl of
Strafford and Archbishop Laud were attained and put to death. Ship-
money was abolished; so also were the Courts of Star Chamber and
High Commission, and a statute was passed to prevent a dissolution
without Parliament's own consent. The Church and the universities
were both attacked, and Charles replied by impeaching before the House
of Lords five members of the Commons, a proceeding which the Com-
mons claimed was their sole privilege. The House vigorously defended
its members, and when the King in person came to order their arrest,
the word " privilege" was uttered loud enough for him to hear. From
this date (1642) the Civil War became inevitable. All sense of moderation
was lost and in 1649 a revolutionary tribunal condemned and executed
1 Text in Stubbs, Charters, Appendix, and in Gardiner, Constitlltional Docllments.
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the King. From 1649 to 1660 various forms ofgovernment were devised
which are of great interest as early examples of the erection of ready-
made constitutions. Most important of all was the Instrument of
Government, a document which purported to be a fundamental constitu-
tion which was to be unchangeable save by particularly complicated
machinery. This document, therefore, may be properly regarded as a
prototype of the written fundamental constitution, as it is known to
American public law. 1
THE COURTS DURING THE INTERREGNUM
Although Sir Edward Coke had found it impossible to avoid taking
a vigorous part in national politics, his successor, Chief Justice Hobart,
succeeded in winning the confidence both of the royalists and the parlia-
mentarians. In fact, the courts were well served during the period of
the Commonwealth; Henry Rolle became Chief Justice of the" Upper
Bench ", while Sir Matthew Hale sat in the Court of Common Pleas
during the Commonwealth and won royal favour after the Restoration.
It is interesting to note that a good many anticipations of modern legal
reforms were proposed during this period although it is hardly necessary
to say that most of these premature advances ceased at the Restoration.
Among them we may mention the settlement of the jurisdiction of the
various courts in order to prevent the scandalous competition between
them. Chancery, which had been bitterly attacked by Sir Edward Coke,
undertook to reform itself; ecclesiastical jurisdiction had already been
abolished. The growth of overseas commerce provoked the reorganisa-
tion of the admiralty courts, while district courts for small claims were
proposed. Legal education was revived in the Inns of Court and legal
records were for a time in English. A good deal of thought was given to
a projected codification of the law, and a system of registering titles to
land was likewise proposed. As early as 1648 an essayist suggested that
there should be only two legal estates, fee simple and for life, abolishing
the entail entirely. Rather less creditable was the proposal to restrict
the equity of redemption to very narrow limits;2 it is difficult to resist
the conclusion that this project emanated from the military and financial
interests who were deeply engaged in speculative, and sometimes corrupt,
operations in land. 3 The eleven short years of Republican rule were too
much filled with war and high politics and religious dissension for these
proposals to reach any very practical result, and the restoration of
1 See E. Jenks, Constitutional Experiments rlj the CommomlJealth (1890); text in Gardiner,
Constitutional Documents. Cf. similar instruments of even earlier date in the New World,
e.g. Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639), New Haven (1639), and the earliest, the
Mqyjlo11Jer compact (1620), brief extracts of which are in MacDonald, Docummtary Source Book
rlj American Hi.rtory.
2 R. W. Turner, Equity rlj Redemption, 30.
3 H. E. Chesney, The Transference of Lands in England, 1640-1660 (Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, 1932), 181-210.
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Charles II. in 1660, automatically restored the state of affairs as it existed
at the eve of the civil war. l
REFORMS AT THE RESTORATrON
The movement had its results. however, for Charles II's reign was
in fact a period of legal reform. At the very commencement tenure
in chivalry was abolished. This abolition of a great deal of mediaeval
law relating to such subjects as wardship, marriage and military tenure
was counterbalanced, however, by an increase in complexity in other
departments of the law of real property. There may be a certain amount
of truth in the suggestion that has several times been made, that periods
of civil disturbance have been frequently accompanied by the develop-
ment ofnew devices by the conveyancers with a view to tying up property
in land so as to put it, as far as possible, beyond the reach of such political
accidents as forfeiture and improvident management. Thus the fifteenth-
century landowners seem to have resorted to the use as a protection-
which the legislature soon defeated, however-against the frequent
forfeitures of legal estates attendant upon the Wars of the Roses. So
in the seventeenth century the widespread confiscations of royalists'
properties2 during the period of the Commonwealth was accompanied
by numerous developments in the art of conveyancing which from this
date onward reached an astonishing degree of technicality.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The reign of Charles II saw the enactment of the Statute of Frauds
(1677). This statute has been so constantly before the courts from
that day to this, and has been adopted in so many jurisdictions, that a
few words must be said as to its origin and policy. There exist a number
of drafts and projects of legislation which illustrate quite cleaJ;ly the
problem involved. 3 A detailed examination of these drafts confirms the
claim of Lord Nottingham to the principal share in its authorship,
although a number of additions and improvements came from other
hands. Like every piece of legislation it must be judged from the stand-
point of the place it held in the legal system as it then existed. If, in the
course of the centuries, conditions have so changed that a piece of old
legislation no longer conduces to justice, then the blame for the situation
must obviously lie not upon the original authors of the statute but upon
the legislatures of to-day. The lawyers of the seventeenth century
had the courage to meet a serious situation by deliberate legislation, and
1 See Robinson, Anticipations under the Commonwealth ojChanges in the Law (Select Essays in
Anglo-American Legal History, i. 467-491). For the Commonwealth practice of giving new
trials when verdicts were unsatisfactory (an innovation at that date) see below; p. 135.
• And, also, the improvidence of many royalists in selling or mortgaging their lands to
finance the civil war, and to pay fines.
a They arc fully discussed in Holdsworth, vi. 379-397.
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we can do no less. If the statute has proved in some respects unsatis-
factory under modern conditions, then the remedy lies in our own hands.
We shall therefore examine for a moment the position which the statute
occupied in the environment wherein its makers placed it.
To begin with, it must be remembered that jury trial in 1677 was still
essentially mediaeva1.l The modern device of ordering a new trial when
the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence was in its infancy.
Again, at this date the law had barely begun to acquire experience in the
handling of parole evidence; such rules as did exist were ancient and
obstructive, for parties to the action, their husbands, and wives, and all
other persons interested in the outcome of the litigation were incompetent
as witnesses. It is obvious, therefore, that the law was faced with two
alternatives in 1677: either the whole law of evidence as it then existed
would have to be scrapped and replaced by a hastily improvised system
upon modern lines, or else parties who desired legal protection for their
transactions must be compelled to take the precaution of embodying
them in documents whose contents and authenticity were easily ascer-
tainable. The first alternative in point of fact hardly existed; it has
taken two centuries of hard experience to develop the law of evidence
thus far, and a great deal still remains to be done. It was only reasonable,
therefore, that the profession, guided by Lord Nottingham,2 should
have adopted the second policy; and from what has just been said it
will surely be clear that under the circumstances they followed the only
practicable path.
As far as these provisions refer to transactions concerning land there
has been less serious cause for complaint. It is in matters of trade and
commerce where business habits have always been to a large extent
informal, that the principal difficulties have arisen. But there is surely
some force in the argument that there should be, in common prudence,
some impersonal evidence available when serious matters are at stake.
" To be fair to its framers, we should, I think, remember three things ",
writes Sir William Holdsworth. "Firstly, the law of contract was as
yet young; it had been developed wholly by decided cases; and it had
very few rules as to the characteristics and incidents of particular con-
tracts. It follows that the framers of the statute were legislating on a
branch of the law which was not fully developed, and on a topic which
had not before been a subject oflegislation."
If a legal system is to depend upon legislation to any extent at all for
its readjustment to newer needs, then the principle of legislation must be
frankly admitted in its entirety, and the profession must be prepared to
undertake a constant and sustained task of securing legislation again and
again in order to enable the law to keep pace with the march of events.
It is clearly illogical to impose legislation at long intervals, restricting the
courts to the comparatively humble work of interpreting the letter, and
1 This can be seen from Bwhel's Case (1670) below, p. 134.
2 At this moment he was Lord Finch.
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then, when confusion results, to blame the legislature of two hundred
years ago.!
THE HABEAS CORPUS ACT
The period from 1660 to the Revolution of 1689 is, however, more
remarkable for its contributions to public than to private law. The
one other great legal reform of the reign of Charles II was the passing
of the Habeas Carpus Act2 in 1679. The writ of habeas corptls has played
such a large part in the struggle for liberty that a short history of it must
be given here. 3 Like a good many other common law writs, its history
can be traced back to the early age when legal procedure and administra-
tive methods were still not distinguished, and, together with the other
prerogative writs of mandamus, certiorari and the rest, 4 its ultimate origin
is in a simple command from the Crown to one of its officials. In the
reign of Edward I there were several varieties of habeas carpus serving
different purposes, such as to secure the appearance of a defendant or of
jurymen. Gradually the courts acquired the habit of issuing the writ in
order to bring before them persons who had been committed by inferior
jurisdictions-particularly the courts of cities and local franchises. The
motive of this policy seems to have been to enlarge the powers of the
Courts of Westminster at the expense of local tribunals, and the result
was not infrequently confusion and injustice. Parties were even allowed
to use this process when they had been committed by judgment of local
courts for debt so as to obtain their release and to defraud their creditors.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find a steady stream of legislation
restricting the scope of habeas corpus.
At the end of the fifteenth century the common law courts had
nothing more to fear from local jurisdictions. A new antagonist
appeared in the form of Chancery, followed soon after by the Courts of
Requests and Star Chamber. The writ of habeas carpus was now turned
against this larger game. The common law courts were indignant
when Chancery committed parties for suing at common law after they
had been enjoined, and Chief Justice Huse proposed to release such
prisoners by means of habeas carpus (1482).5 The Courts of Admiralty
and High Commission were similarly attacked, but it was in the seven-
teenth century that habeas corpus fought its greatest battle. The Crown
had established the right of imprisoning without trial upon a warrant
signed by the Secretary of State and a few Privy Councillors, alleging
"her Majesty's special commandment ".6 Against so serious a claim
1 Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds was repealed by 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 34 (1954).
• Text in Stubbs, Select Charters, Appendix, and C. Grant Robertson, Select Statutes.
3 For details see Holdsworth, ix. 108-125, x. 658-672.
« See generally, E. Jenks, The Prerogative Writs iI/ EI/glish Lalv, Yale Law Journal, xxxii.
523, and S. A. de Smith, The PrerogativB lP'rits, Cambridge Law Joumal, xi. 40.
5 Y.B.22 Edw. IV, Michs. 21.
6 So it seemed from the" Rules in Anderson ": Holdswortb, v. 495, x. 661, Taswell-
Langmead, COl/stitutiol/al History ofEI/glal/d (10th edn.), 347.
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of State absolutism habeas corpus became in the words of Selden "the
highest remedy in law for any man that is imprisoned ". .
Throughout the Stuart period habeas corpus was steadily l~sed a~d
improved by the courts of common law. But procedural difficultIes
stood in the way. Darnel's Casel had shown doubts; the special com-
mand of the King was nevertheless there held to be a sufficient return,
and this rule was only abolished by the Petition of Right. 2 There were
also doubts as to which courts were competent to issue it. Many of these
defects were remedied in the Habeas Corp,,,s Act3 of 1679, which after
much discussion finally passed the House of Lords-and then only
owing to a mistake in the counting of the votes, so the story goes.
By this act any judge during term or vacation must issue the writ unless
the prisoner is obviously committed by lawful means. Prisoners are
not to be imprisoned beyond the realm, and the writ is to run in all
privileged places. Later legislation at various dates introduced still
further improvements. Some striking examples of its use in more
modern times are SOJltmersett's Case,4 where a writ of habeas corpus released
a negro slave from confinement in a ship on the Thames, on the ground
that an allegation of slavery was not a sufficient return. In 1798 the
writ was used to ensure a trial at common law of a prisoner, Wolfe Tone,
who had been condemned by a court-martial. 5
THE STOP OF THE EXCHEQUER
There is one other incident in the reign of Charles II which must
be mentioned, for it introduces us to a more modern element in law
and society. Merchants and tradesmen who had the means frequently
made loans as a subsidiary to their normal business. The scriveners
(professional writers of" court-hand" who engrossed legal documents)
were particularly associated with this business in the reign of Elizabeth,
but after the Civil War and under the Restoration it was the goldsmiths
who became most prominent. Moreover, these goldsmiths invented
a few variations which really turned the old casual money-lending into
professional banking. They accepted deposits from customers, at first
merely for storage in their vaults, but soon in the more modern sense
of deposits against which they issued notes.6 Already in Charles II's
reign, such deposits could be drawn upon by the customer's cheque.
The goldsmiths became financiers, discounted bills, and also purchased
tallies (receipts for money lent to the Exchequer). These tallies were
13 S.T. 1 (1627).
a 3 Charles I, c. 1, s. 5 (1628).
331 Charles II, c. 2. See David Ogg, England in the Reign ofCharlet II, ii. 510-512.
, 20 S.T. 1; E. Fiddes, LordMansjie!dandthe SommersetlCase, Law Quarterly Review, 1. 499.
527 S.T. 614.
8 See Professor Tawney's long and illuminating introduction to his edition of Sir Thomas
Wilson's DisCOHrsc lipan USllry, and R. D. Richards, Early History ofBanking in England, 37 fr.
(1929); below, p. 68.
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sometimes sold direct to the goldsmiths by the Exchequer,l thus serving
as the machinery whereby the government raised short-term loans, and
in 1672 the Government found itself unable to meet them when they
became due. This crisis was called the " Stop of the Exchequer" and
had serious results for the goldsmiths and their depositors. Recent
research suggests that the King's motives may have been less fraudulent
than the Whig historians asserted, and that the resulting ruin has been
grossly exaggerated. 2 Here we are concerned only with the more general
significance of the rise of banking and public finance with the need for
new legal principles to govern them, and with the great Bankers' Case 3
growing out the stop of the exchequer which settled the constitutional
question of the right to bring a petition of right.
RESTORATION OF CHURCH AND PREROGATIVE
The reign of Charles II saw the re-establishment in a harsher form
of the Church of England, and the short reign of James II witnessed
a rapid crisis. The determination of that monarch to pursue a religious
policy which was contrary to that solemnly laid down by Parliament
in a long series of statutes was the immediate cause of his fall. It may
have been that his project of complete toleration for Roman Catholics
as well as Dissenters was intrinsically an advance upon the partisanship
of the Church as represented in Parliament. But it is impossible to
discuss the merits of the policy when the methods of its promotion
were so drastic and so completely contrary to the spirit of contemporary
institutions. James II claimed that by his prerogative he could dispense
individual cases from the operation of a statute; more than that, he even
endeavoured to suspend entirely the operation of certain of the religious
laws. Upon this clear issue the conflict was fought out. After an
ineffective show of military force James II retired to France, William III
of Holland was invited by Parliament to become joint ruler with his
wife, Mary II, james's daughter, and so " the great and glorious revolu-
tion " was accomplished. The terms of the settlement were embodied
in the last great constitutional documents in English history, the Bill of
Rights (1689) and the Act of Settlement (1701). .
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The principal portions of the Bill of Rights 4 are as follows:
" That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws,
by regall authority, without consent of Parlyament is illegall.
1 Tallies, being in wood, were often accompanied by written "orders for repayment"
whose importance is described by R. D. Richards, op. cit. 58 If.
a R. D. Richards, The Stop of the Exchequer, in Economic History (supplement to the
Economic Journal), ii. 45-62.
314 S.T. 1 (1690-1700); the case is fully discussed in Holdsworth, ix. 32-39.
4 1 William & Mary, sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
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" That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws,
by regaU authoritie, as it hath beene assumed and exercised of late, is illegaU.
" That the commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesias-
ticall Causes, and all other commissions and courts of like nature, are iJIegall and
pernicious,
" That levying money for or to the use of the Crowne by pretence of prerogative,
without grant of Parlyament for longer time or in other manner than the same is
or shall be granted, is illegal!.
" That it is the right of the subject to petition the King, and all commitments
and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegall.
" That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdome in time of
peace, unless it be with consent of Parlyament, is against law.
"That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence
suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.
" That elections of members of Parlyament ought to be free.
"That the freedome of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parlyament,
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parlyament.
" That excessive baiJe ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed;
nor cruell and unusuall punishment inflicted.
" That jurors ought to be duely impannelled and returned, and jurors which
passe upon men in tdaUs for high treason ought to be freeholders.
" That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons
before conviction, are illegal and void.
" And that for redresse of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening,
and preserveing of the lawes, Parlyament ought to be held frequently.
" And they doe claime, demand, and insist upon all and singular the premisses,
as their undoubted rights and liberties; and that noe declarations, judgments,
doeings or proceedings, to the prejudice of the people in any of the said premisses,
ought in anywise to be drawne hereafter into consequence or example."
THE ACT OF SETTLEMENT
After the death of Queen Mary (1694), William III ruled alone,
tltil he in turn was succeeded by her sister, Anne (1702-1714), who
'as therefore the last of the reigning Stuarts; in order to secure the
lccession, the Act of Settlement was passed in 1701 which not only
Limited the descent of the Crown (in accordance with which the present
royal family reigns) but also added a few constitutional provisions
supplementary to those of the Bill of Rights. It required the monarch
to be in communion with the Church of England, and not to leave the
country without parliamentary consent-an irksome provision which
was soon repealed. Membership of the Privy Council and of Parlia-
ment was limited to British subjects of British parentage. It was like~
wise provided "that no person who has an office or place of profit
under the King, or receives a pension from the Crown, shall be capable
of serving as a member of the House of Commons ". This attempt
to limit the Crown's influence in Parliament was subsequently amendedl
in order to permit ministers of the Crown to sit in the House of Com-
mons by allowing them to seek re-election after their appointment
to a salaried office. Such was the practice until 1926, when the need for
1 By a long line of statutes too numerous to detail here.
THE STUARTS 61
re-election was abolished. Another chapter provided that judges
should hold office during good behaviour at fixed salaries, and that
they should only be removable by His Majesty upon an address of both
Houses of Parliament; the complete independence of the bench was
therefore permanently established.
REVOLUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY
The changes and chances of seventeenth-century politics had pro-
duced a great number of varying theories concerning the State and the .
nature of government. In the beginning of the century divine right
was ranged against a parliamentarianism which looked to the middle
ages for its justification. The period of the Commonwealth accustomed
people to see a succession of different forms of government set up and
then deliberately pulled down. The lesson was clear: the people had
in their hands the power and the right to set up forms of government
according to their fancy. A large number of political thinkers of
different schools took up this idea, and were prepared to treat existing
governments as if they had been the deliberate product of popular action.
It merely remained to ascertain exactly what policy the people had
. proposed to pursue when they did this. We consequently find many
different suggestions as to the form which this original contract, as they
regarded it, received. The seventeenth century and much of .the eigh-
teenth were occupied in searching for forms of contract which should
afford a reasonable justification for political sodety, either as it existed,
or as the philosopher thought it ought to exist.
THOMAS HOBBES
Out of this welter of speculation only a few names can be mentioned
here. Undoubtedly the most remarkable of them was Thomas Hobbes,
whose greatest work, The Leviathan,! appeared in 1651. Unlike almost
all of his contemporaries, he entirely rejected the study of history as
having any bearing on political science; instead, he pinned his faith
to " geometry, which is the only science that it hath hitherto pleased
God to bestow on mankind"-words which have a strangely familiar
sound in these latter days. His outlook was entirely materialistic. All
knowledge is derived through the senses; every idea is the result of an
effect produced upon an organ of sense by the motion of an external
object; felidty means success in getting what one wants. Were it not
for civil government, life would consist of the ruthless competition of
unmoral men for desirable things, and would be " solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short". It is only the tremendous power of the State which
protects the natural man against himself and his fellows, and from this
power are derived the ideas of justice and property-for in the pre-civil
1 The !Avia/han has been edited with an illuminating introduction by Michael Oakeshott
(Oxford: Blackwell).
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State " that only is a man's that he can get? and for s? long .as he ~an
keep it ". Where other thinkers had conceived of society as mvolvmg
a contract between ruler and subject, Hobbes devised a completely
different scheme. According to his view, helpless and miserable man-
kind made a contract, every man with another, to submit to a ruler whom
they all clothed with authority to govern them. This ruler was no party
to the contract and is therefore bound by no limitations. Consequently
it is impossible to talk about a sovereign having broken his contract with
the nation (which was a common argument in the seventeenth century),
for no such contract existed. Nor is there any justification for resistance
to the sovereign. We seem to see in these theories a deep impatience
with the turmoils of the Stuart period. Neither the antiquarianism of
Parliament nor the mysticism of divine right had any meaning to the
dry, penetrating, but narrow mind of Hobbes. The troubles of the
Commonwealth, deeply involved as they were with religion, are reflected
in his treatment of the Church. His own position seems to be that of a
deist. He recommends that there be but one Church in a State, and that
under the absolute control of the sovereign leviathan; he even asserts
that the sovereign necessarily has full authority to preach, baptise and
administer the sacraments, and that the clergy only perform these func-
tions by delegation from the State, whose will is the source of both
temporal and spiritual law. It is only natural that a century which
was so animated by sincere religious dissension should either neglect or
revile a thinker at once so original and so cynical.1
JOHN LOCKE AND THE REVOLUTION
If Hobbes represents the desperate longing for an omnipotent
peaceful State which was natural in the midst of the darkest hours of
the seventeenth century, it is in John Locke (1632-1704) that we find,
after the storm had passed, a quiet summary of achievement full of
the spirit of compromise. In the nineteenth century when it seemed that
the leviathan had indeed come to life, Hobbes was to receive due recog-
nition, but in the eighteenth century it was rather John Locke's influence
which was paramount, for it was he who discovered a reasonable philo-
sophical basis for the whole of seventeenth-century history, and more
particularly for the Revolution of 1689. John Locke learned from
history something that Hobbes refused to consider. He made a great
plea for religious toleration and embodied it in the " Fundamental Con-
stitution" of Carolina, which he drafted in 1669 on the invitation of the
proprietors of the province, and his example was to be improved by
William Penn in his form of government for Pennsylvania. It is to
] ohn Locke that we owe a reasonable theory of limited monarchy which
1 It is worth noting that Sir Frederick Pollock writes: "I have learned much from Hobbes,
and hold acquaintance with his work at first hand indispensable for all English-speaking men
who give any serious consideration to the theoretical part of either politics or law JJ (Fir.!
Book. offurisprmkme, vii).
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was to become the creed of the Whig party. Locke's view of the contract
was much less extreme than that of Hobbes. In his thought every
individual conveys to society as a whole his right of executing the law
of nature; all other natural rights he retains. Locke, therefore, brings
us back to the old idea that the powers of the State are limited to certain
purposes. It is his discussion of the mode in which those powers are
exercised which has the greatest interest at the present day. His theory
of reserved natural rights leaves a large place for religious toleration,
while the limitations he places upon the State are more in accordance with
history than is the absolute leviathan which Hobbes conceived. Where
Hobbes had considered law to be the command of the State, Locke
returned to the notion of natural law-a conception which was easily
reconciled with the mediaeval view of law as the will of God. Where
Hobbes had made law the tool of the State, Locke regarded it as the
guardian of liberty.
Locke declared that the legislature is the supreme power in the
State, and from this he deduced certain maxims of constitutional practice
which, in fact, were the historical settlement reached at the end of the
seventeenth century. And so beginning from general philosophical
and theoretical considerations, Locke proceeds to give a philosophical
defence of such very practical measures as the Bill of Rights, the Act of
Settlement, parliamentary control over taxation, and the whole machinery
of limited monarchy.
It seems that Locke was the first modern theorist to propound a
doctrine of the separation of powers. He observed that legislation is
(or in his day was) an intermittent function, while the executive, on
the other hand, must never cease its activity. Consequently, the two
are better assigned to different bodies, which, he observes, is almost
universally the practice-and here we seem to see an example of that
comparative study of institutions which had been prominent in Engl-and
ever since the days of Fortescue, Sir Thomas Smith and others. In
his discussion of the relations between the legislature and the executive,
Locke very dearly is thinking of current politics although his treatment
is confined to scrupulously general terms. How close this theory was
to current practical politics can be seen where he urges the separation
of legislature from executive; this object would have been achieved
through the passage we have just quoted from the Act of Settlement
excluding ministers from the House of Commons, which was passed
only four years before the death of Locke.1 Locke's suggestions on
the separation of powers were obviously derived from his observation
of contemporary English practice; indeed, the easy way in which he
seems to take the situation for granted is an indication that he felt it
too obvious to need very detailed theoretical treatment. It is only a
century later that his work will be used as a basis for a rediscovery
by the great philosopher Montesquieu of a general theoretical doctrine
1 Above, p. 60.
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of the separation of powers such as Aristotle and Marsiglio had suggested
in ancient and mediaeval times.
John Locke, therefore, may be regarded as expressing to a peculiar
degree the compromise and settlement which the nation had reached
when the expulsion of the Stuarts and the accession of William III had
enabled political passions to die down. His summary of the results
of the great conflict remained for many years the justification on philo-
sophical grounds of the compromise which practical politics had reached,
and with his work the tumultuous drama of the seventeenth century
fittingly ends on a quiet and hopeful note.1
1 Locke's theories have been aptly summarised in the following words: "It was a theory
of a state of nature that was not altogether bad, and its transformation into a civil state that
was not altogether good, by a contract that was not very precise in its terms or very clear in
its sanction. It embodied, moreover, a conception of sovereignty of the people without too
much of either sovereignty or people; of the law of nature that involved no clear definition
of either law or nature; of natural rights, but not too many of them; and of a separation of
powers that was not too much of a separation. It concluded, finally, with a doctrine as to the
right of revolution that left no guaranty whatever for the permanence of the rather loose-
jointed structure which the rest of the theory had built up. Yet this illogical, incoherent
system of political philosophy was excellently adapted to the constitutional system which
England needed at that time and which the Whigs actually put and kept in operation. It was
a good, respectable, common-sense view of the features of politicallife that impressed a
philosophical observer; it was strong in the individual parts, if not in their correlation, and
it was far better adapted to make an impression on thinking Englishmen than were the more
logical systems of Hobbes and Spinoza" (Dunning, History of Political Theories: Luther to
MONtesquieu,367-3(8).
